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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
Case No. 20050412-CA

v.
GREGORY SHANE WAREHAM,
Defendant/ Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from convictions of one count each of aggravated
kidnapping, a first degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-302
(West 2004); driving under the influence of alcohol, a third degree felony, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (West 2004); criminal mischief and
assault, both class B misdemeanors, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6106(2)(c) & 76-5-102 (West 2004); and intoxication and open container in a
vehicle, both class C misdemeanors, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9701(1) & 41-6-44.20(2) (West 2004). The Utah Supreme Court poured the case
over to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-2a-3(j) (West 2004).

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
la.

Did defendant invite any error in the jury instruction defining

reasonable doubt by asking the trial court to instruct the jury that the State's
proof must "obviate all reasonable doubt?"
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue.
lb. Did instructing the jury that "[t]he state must eliminate (or obviate) all
reasonable doubt" violate defendant's due process rights?
Standard of Review. "'Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law
presents a question of law .. . review[ed] for correctness.'" Mueller v. Allen, 2005
UT App. 477, \Y7, 538 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, (quoting State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT
118,111,62 P.3d 444).
2. Did the trial court err in failing to appoint substitute counsel based on
defendant's claim that Mr. Benge had a conflict of interest because he had
previously prosecuted defendant?
Standard of Review. "[Wjhether the Sixth Amendment required the trial
court to appoint substitute counsel" is a question of law "review [ed] for
correctness." State v. Valencia, 2001 UT App 159, f 9, 27 P.3d 573 (citing State v.
Maguire, 1999 UT App 45,15,975 P.2d 476).
3.

Did the trial court erroneously deny defendant's motion for a

continuance to locate one of his three character witnesses?

2

Standard of Review. "A trial court's decision to grant a continuance is a
matter of discretion, . . . review[ed] . . . for abuse of that discretion. State v.
Taylor, 2005 UT 40, |8,116 P.3d 360 (citing Seel v. Van Der Veur, 971 R2d 924, 926
(Utah 1998)).
4. Did defendant's conviction for assault merge into his conviction for
aggravated kidnapping when the two convictions were based on materially
different acts?
Standard of Review. The Court should not review this claim because it is
unpreserved and defendant argues no exception to the preservation rule. Had
defendant preserved the claim, the issue would be reviewed for correctness. See
State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, | 6 , 122 P.3d 615 ("whether one crime is a lesser
included offense, which merges with a greater included offense, is a legal
question of statutory interpretation reviewed for correctness") (citing State v.
Bluff, 2002 UT 66, %37,52 P.3d 1210).
5. Did the presiding judge correctly deny defendant's motion to recuse
Judge Anderson?
Standard of Review. A reviewing judge's ruling on a motion to recuse,
referred to him under Rule 29, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. See State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1998) (citing State
v. Neeley, 748 R2d 1091,1094-95 (Utah 1988)).

3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Resolution of this case requires interpretation of the following statutes and
rules, the full text of which is included in Addendum A:
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102 (West 2004) (Assault)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-302 (West 2004) (Aggravated kidnapping)
Utah R. Crim. P. 29 (Disqualification of a judge)
Utah R. Civ. P. 10 (Form of pleadings and other papers).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On 16 April 2004 the State charged defendant with the following counts:
1) aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony;
2) aggravated burglary, a first degree felony;
3) commission of domestic violence in the presence of a child, a
third degree felony;
4) driving under the influence of alcohol with priors, a third degree
felony;
5) criminal mischief, a third degree felony;
6) assault, a class A misdemeanor;
7) possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor;
8) driving on a suspended licence, a class C misdemeanor;
9) intoxication, a class C misdemeanor; and
10) open container in a vehicle, a class C misdemeanor.
R.2-6. Following a preliminary hearing, counts 3, 5, and 6 were amended to class
B misdemeanors. R.153. At trial, the State dismissed counts 7 and 8. R.178: 2526; 179:99-102.

4

A jury convicted defendant on counts 1, 4-6, and 9-10; and acquitted on
counts 2 and 3. R.145-46. Defendant then waived his right to have a jury decide
whether he had two prior DUI convictions within ten years. R.179:139-40. The
trial court so found, and enhanced defendant's DUI conviction to a third degree
felony. R.179:139-40.
During trial, defendant was thrice found in contempt of court. R.178:23740,179:68, 70. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve thirty days in jail for
the first instance of contempt. R. 178:239-40. The court did not impose any
additional penalty for defendant's other instances of contempt, and suspended
all but one day of the original thirty-day contempt sentence. R.179:161-62.
The trial court sentenced defendant to serve concurrent prison sentences of
ten years to life on count 1, zero to five years on count 4, six months each on
counts 5 and 6, and ninety days each on counts 7 and 8. R.154-55. Defendant
timely appeals. R.157,165.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On 24 March 2004, defendant, in a drunken rage, ransacked Jennifer
Malaska's trailer home in La Sal, leaving a wake of broken lamps, picture frames,
and furniture. R.178:87-89, 92-99. Defendant left, but returned a short while later
and threw a log with a partially-embedded maul through the front-room
window of the trailer, while Jennifer and her daughter sat inside. R.178:103-05,

5

119. Defendant then entered the trailer, dragged Jennifer through the shards of
glass, and drove off with her in his truck.

R.178:lll-13.

As they drove,

defendant told Jennifer that her "trip was almost over" and that her "daughter
didn't need a mother any more." R.178:113,115,116.
"Drunker and drunker"
Defendant and Jennifer lived together from 1999 to November, 2003, but
they continued to see each other after defendant moved out. R.178:86-88. On 24
March 2004, defendant and Jennifer traveled from Jennifer's home in La Sal to
Monticello, where defendant applied for a job. R.178:87-89. They bought a pint
of Jagermeister and some bottles of Mickey's Bigmouth at the liquor store before
driving back to La Sal 1 R.178:90, 91, 124-25. Jennifer and Defendant each took
turns driving back to La Sal; both had a couple of shots of Jagermeister during
the trip. R.178:90, 91,125,142. The two planned to go "hiking in the hills" and
stopped by a golf course in Monticello to see if a mutual friend, Todd McKey,
wanted to join them. R.178:90,125-26. However, the two "wound up just goin'
home." R.178:90.

After they arrived home, defendant made himself a drink

1

Jagermeister is a 70-proof (35% alcohol) liqueur flavored with 56 herbs. See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jagermeister, visited 3 January 2006. "Mickey's
Bigmouth" is apparently a beer with a with a greater alcohol content than beers
sold outside of state liquor stores. R.179:29.

6

with "100 proof vodka" and went to a friend's house for "about an hour, taking
the vodka with him."* R.178:94,138.
Jennifer believed that defendant was getting "drunker and drunker" as the
day progressed. R.178:92. When he returned from the friend's house, defendant
was violent, irrational, and upset with Jennifer for no apparent reason. R.178:92,
95, 96. Although he could walk, defendant was "wobbly" and his speech was
slurred. R.178:96. Defendant started yelling at Jennifer "that [she] was trash, like
[her] neighbors."

R.178:96. Jennifer was bewildered by defendant's actions

because, up to that point, "[they] had had a nice day together." R.178:96,100.
Defendant started "throwing lamps around," screaming, and acting like he
was going to hurt Jennifer." R.178:97. He told Jennifer that she "was nothin'."
R. 178:97. He was tearing pictures off the walls, breaking lamps and furniture,
and "just ransacking the house." R.178:97. Jennifer felt threatened because,
based on her experience with defendant, "once he's through breaking my things,
if it doesn't [a]ffect me and get me in a fight mode with him, then I'm next."
R.178:98.

2

"Proof" is the alcohol content of distilled liquors. It is the percentage of
alcohol multiplied by two. Therefore, 100 proof vodka would contain 50%
alcohol. See http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/002446.htm,
visited 3 January 2006.
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Defendant and Jennifer had fought before, sometimes with Jennifer on the
offensive.3 R.178:100, 101. However, this time was different because Jennifer
"wasn't on the offense."

R.178:100. Jennifer explained that she "was on the

defense," because defendant's violence "caught [her] . . . way off guard."
R.178:100.
After he "[bjroke everything up," defendant left for about thirty minutes.
R.178:102,104. While defendant was gone, Jennifer went outside to talk to her
neighbor because she wondered if her neighbor had said something to upset
defendant. R. 178:102. Jennifer then got her daughter, went back in her trailer,
and locked the door. R.178:88,102.
Defendant returned. R.178:103. Jennifer and her daughter were sitting in
the trailer's living room. R.178: 119. A log with a partially-embedded maul sat
on Jennifer's porch. R.178:104-05. Defendant picked up the log and maul and
threw them through Jennifer's front window. R.178:104-05. Because she did not
have a telephone, Jennifer tried to stall defendant so her daughter could get out
of the trailer and call the police. R.178:107. Jennifer asked defendant not to break
out all her windows and offered to open the front door. R.178:106-07. While her
daughter went out a window, Jennifer opened the door. R.178:107.
3

Jennifer described one incident when she walked into a bar and saw
defendant with "his hand up some girl's skirt." R.178:136. Jennifer tapped
defendant on the shoulder and punched him. R.178:136. Defendant said that the
blow caused him to "s[ee] stars." R.178:136.
8

"It wasn't gonna get better, unless I obeyed."
Defendant entered and started punching and kicking Jennifer. R.178:107.
He threw her down, grabbed her hair, and punched her in the face so hard that
her teeth went through her lip. R.178:107-08, 109, 164. Defendant punched
Jennifer "at least five or six" times while she begged him to stop. R.178:108-09.
He also kicked Jennifer "at least three times." R.178:109. Throughout the beating
defendant was telling Jennifer to get in the truck. R.178:110.
Jennifer had no desire to leave with defendant and feared for her safety
because she believed defendant would continue to beat her.

R.178:110.

However, she explained that she also believed "[i]t wasn't gonna get better,
unless I obeyed." R.178:110.
Defendant grabbed Jennifer by her hair and arm and dragged her through the
broken glass out to the porch. R.178:lll, 115. Jennifer then got up and went to
defendant's truck. R.178:lll. Jennifer begged and pleaded with defendant to go
away and leave her alone. R.178:115. She did not try to run away because she
knew that defendant could outrun her.4 R.178:130.
With Jennifer in the passenger seat, defendant drove one or two miles up a
hill near Jennifer's trailer and turned around. R.178:113, 119. Jennifer believed
that defendant was going to kill her because he told her that her "trip was almost
4

At 250 pounds, Jennifer was physically larger than defendant. R.178: 14950; 179:125.
9

over" and that he was going to go to Mexico "because if you kill somebody in the
United States and you go to Mexico, they won't bring you back/' R.17&113,116.
He also remarked that her "daughter didn't need a mother any more."
R.178.-113,115.
From her location on the hill, Jennifer could see the police gathering on the
road near her trailer. R.178:113-14. The police eventually noticed some lights
from defendant's truck and started up the hill. R.178:114-15. Defendant jumped
out of the truck and told Jennifer, "Come on." R.178:115. Hoping to delay
defendant, Jennifer pretended that her door would not open. R.178:116. Once
she believed that the police were close enough, Jennifer jumped out of the truck
and "ran straight to the police cars." R.178:116.
"She was shaking so bad she couldn't hardly ... walk/'
When Officer Harris arrived at Jennifer's residence, Jennifer's daughter
told him that she was afraid for her mother because defendant had taken her.
R.178:157. When he entered Jennifer's trailer, Officer Harris observed "furniture
scattered everywhere . . . lamps were broken . . . blood spots on the floor . . .
[and] broken glass." R.178:158. Officer Harris and other emergency personnel
were formulating a plan to search for defendant's truck when someone observed
lights on the nearby hill. R.178:160. Officer Harris and Trooper Taylor drove up
the hill and found defendant's truck. R.178:160-61. As the officers approached,
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Jennifer "came running out from around the passenger side of the truck, headed
towards [Officer Harris's] vehicle." R.178:161. Jennifer was "screamin' and
yellin'" and appeared "terrified." R.178:161. Officer Harris explained that "she
was shaking so bad she couldn't hardly run, couldn't hardly walk." R.178:161.
Jennifer "was covered . . . in garbage [and] debris" and there was blood on her
legs. R.178:161.
Defendant was also bleeding. R.178:174. Defendant's balance was "very
poor," he smelled strongly of alcohol, his eyes were red and bloodshot, and his
speech was slurred. R.178:165-66.
Defendant's Version
Defendant testified that on 24 March 2004, he and Jennifer drove to
Monticello in Jennifer's car to inquire about a job for him. R.178:192. After
learning that he had a job, defendant and Jennifer decided to celebrate by
purchasing a bottle of Jagermeister and a six-pack of Mickey's Bigmouth.
R.178:193. Defendant also had some beer in the car and some vodka in his truck
in La Sal. R.178:193. He and Jennifer planned to go camping that evening.
R.178199.
Defendant claimed that when he and Jennifer left Monticello, he had only
consumed "two large mixed drinks," but Jennifer had consumed two large
mixed drinks, two of the Mickey's Bigmouths, and "almost half a bottle of Jager."
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R.178:195-96. He claimed that Jennifer continued to drink on the trip back to La
Sal. R.178.199.
Defendant claimed that when he and Jennifer got home, he took Jennifer's
daughter to a neighbor's residence to see if the neighbor would baby sit.
R.178:200.

Defendant admitted that he "might have had a beer" with the

neighbor.

R.178:201. Defendant left Jennifer's daughter with the neighbor,

returned to Jennifer's place, and started to assemble supplies for the camping
trip. R.178:201. He knew that it was around 5:30 pm because "The Simpsons"
was on television and he sat down to watch the program. R.178:201. Jennifer
had gone to visit another neighbor. R.178:201.
"She knows Judo and she's dangerous"

Defendant then claimed that Jennifer returned, hit him "with a big
porcelain lamp" as he lay on the couch, and accused him of stealing her "Jager."
R.178:202. Although he was allegedly hit on the head, defendant claimed that
the lamp cut his finger so badly he required several stitches.5

R.178:202.

Defendant explained that when Jennifer tried to hit him with the rest of the
broken lamp, he grabbed her arms and they both fell down. R. 178:204. At this
point, defendant explained that "there was actual fighting goin' on" with
Jennifer hitting defendant and defendant hitting her with the back of his hand.
5

Officer Harris testified that he took defendant to the hospital to have his
injuries treated and that defendant received stitches. R.178:177-78.
12

R.178:208. Defendant explained that Jennifer was "[his] equal or better in a fist
fight/'

R.178:208. According to defendant, Jennifer "knows Judo and she's

dangerous/'

R.178:208.

Defendant testified that Jennifer had successfully

assaulted him many times before. R.178:204.
Defendant testified that he eventually told Jennifer that he was leaving,
grabbed some of his belongings, and started putting them in his truck. R.178:204.
Defendant claimed that Jennifer then jumped in the driver's seat of his truck.
R.178:205. Believing that they were now going camping, defendant also got in
the truck and they "took off." R.178:205,209.
As they drove, defendant claimed that he could see the approaching lights
of the police cars and told Jennifer to take a particular turnoff, but Jennifer
instead turned up the road that leads up the hill near her trailer. R.178:205.
Defendant believed that Jennifer's neighbor had called the police because he and
Jennifer had had a fight, and the neighbor "likes to call the cops over anything."
R.178:205.
Defendant admitted that he threw the log with the maul through the
trailer window. R.178:223. However, he claimed that he was merely trying to
throw it towards the porch, but "threw it a little too hard." R.178:223. The porch
was five or six feet away from the trailer window. R.178:223.

13

The State's rebuttal
On rebuttal, Officer Harris testified that he did not find any broken lamp
parts or pieces on either sofa in Jennifer's trailer. R.179:45. Officer Harris also
testified that he did not observe any bruising, scuffing, or other marks on
defendant's head that would indicate that defendant had been hit there.
R.179:50, 53. Moreover, defendant did not complain to Officer Harris or any
other emergency personnel about a head injury. R.179:50. Officer Harris also
testified that when he located defendant and Jennifer, he observed that the
steering wheel in defendant's truck had blood around nearly its entire
circumference, and that the blood was still wet.

R.179:49, 54, 56.

Unlike

defendant, Jennifer did not have any cuts on her hands. R.179:28. Defendant
eventually admitted at sentencing that he was the one who drove his truck away
from Jennifer's residence and up the hill. R.179:157.
The trial court's recommendation
At sentencing, the trial court specifically found that"there is convincing
evidence t h a t . . . the acts of [defendant] may have resulted in a murder, had not
the police arrived in time to intervene." R.179:161. The court included this
finding in its judgment and sentence. R.155.

14

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. This Court should not consider defendant's challenge to the reasonable
doubt jury instruction because he invited the error he now complains of by
asking the trial court to include the word "obviate" in the instruction. In any
event, defendant's claim fails on the merits because the prosecutor did not argue
that the State's proof only had to refute doubts that were sufficiently defined —
the potential problem that the Utah Supreme Court identified with the now
abandoned "obviate all reasonable doubt" concept.
II. Defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court erred in denying his
request for substitute counsel based on the fact that Mr. Benge had prosecuted
him for one of the DUI convictions that was used to enhance his present DUI
conviction. The trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into defendant's claim
of conflict. In any event, any inadequacy in the inquiry was harmless because
defendant fails to demonstrate that his counsel had an actual conflict of interest.
III. The trial court acted within its discretion in denying defendant's
motion for a continuance to locate a third character witness, Diana Hacker.
Hacker's proffered testimony would have been merely cumulative of the
character testimony that was presented from defendant's two other character
witnesses. Moreover, any error was harmless because the additional evidence
would not have created a reasonable likelihood of acquittal.

15

IV. Defendant's merger claim is unpreserved. In any event, his assault
conviction did not merge with his aggravated kidnapping conviction because
materially different acts established the two convictions. Defendant's assault
was complete before the aggravated kidnapping began.
V. Defendant has not demonstrated actual bias, or that the presiding judge
abused his discretion in denying defendant's motion to recuse Judge Anderson.
Even assuming that Judge Anderson instructed his clerks not to accept any pro
se filings from defendant that did not bear a case number, that instruction was
proper. As a represented party, defendant had no right to file pro se pleadings.
In any event, defendant has not demonstrated how such an instruction could
demonstrate actual bias.
ARGUMENT
I. DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR IN THE REASONABLE
DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION; IN ANY EVENT, THE
INSTRUCTION DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS
Defendant claims that the reasonable doubt instruction violated his federal
due process rights. Aplt. Br. at 26-30. That instruction, in compliance with State
v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), overruled in relevant part by State v. Reyes,
2005 UT 33, p 0 , 1 1 6 P.3d 305, informed the jury that "[t]he state must eliminate
(or obviate) all reasonable doubt." R. 133 (a copy of the instruction is included in
Addendum B).

However, after trial, the Utah Supreme Court "expressly
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abadonjed]" the "'obviate all reasonable doubt' element of the Robertson test."
Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at f30.
Based on Reyes, defendant argues that the phrase "eliminate (or obviate) all
reasonable doubt" created a "substantial risk that a juror found [him] guilty
based on a degree of proof below beyond a reasonable doubt." Aplt. Br. at 29.
However, this Court should not consider defendant's claim because he invited
any error. In any event, the instruction did not violate defendant's due process
rights.
A, Defendant invited any error by asking the trial court to
include the term "obviate" in the instruction.
Prior to closing arguments, the parties and the Court met to discuss the
jury instructions.

R.179:94-98.

The trial court proposed a "standard stock

instruction^" regarding reasonable doubt.6 R.179:94. Defense counsel asked that
the reasonable doubt instruction "have the word obviate inserted." R.179:95.
The prosecutor responded with a request to "add another word that is more in
the lexicon of what people would understand" if the trial court chose to include
the word "obviate."

R.179:95.

The finalized reasonable doubt instruction

included the phrase:

"[t]he State must eliminate (or obviate) all reasonable

doubt." R.133 (Add. B).

The record does not contain the precise language of the proposed
instruction.
17

A Utah appellate court will not review a challenge to the jury instruction
when a defendant invites the error by submitting an erroneous instruction. State
v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT16, ^[12, 86 P.3d 742. "While a party who fails to object to
. . . an instruction may have [the] instruction assigned as error under the manifest
injustice exception, . . . 'a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at
trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error/" Id. at f9
(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)). Thus, in Geukgeuzian,
the Utah Supreme Court refused to review the defendant's jury instruction claim
because defendant "led the trial court into adopting the erroneous jury
instruction that he now challenges on appeal" by submitting the erroneous
instruction to the trial court. Id. at ^[12. Similarly, this Court has also held that "a
party may not appeal a jury instruction that the same party submitted or
requested." State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201,1205 (Utah 1991).
In this case, defendant asked the trial court to include the term "obviate."
R.179:95. He therefore invited any error in the instruction and cannot now claim
that the instruction misdefined the reasonable doubt standard. See Geukgeuzian,
2004 UT 16 at Tf 12; Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1205.
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B. Defendant's Reyes challenge fails because the prosecutor
did not argue that the State needed to refute only "doubts
that are sufficiently defined/'
Defendant's claim lacks merit in any event.

The due process danger

identified in the Reyes opinion did not arise here.
The reasonable doubt instruction given at trial, reproduced here in its
entirety, contained the phrase "eliminate (or obviate) all reasonable doubt":
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant
throughout the trial. If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond a
reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted.
The state must eliminate (or obviate) all reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty.
Reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in
view of all the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on
fancy, imagination, or wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond
a reasonable doubt is enough proof to satisfy the mind, or convince
the understanding of those bound to act conscientiously, and
enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a
doubt that reasonable people would entertain based upon the
evidence in the case.
R. 133 (emphasis added) (Addendum B).
The Reyes court found the "'obviate all reasonable doubt' concept"
"[i]nsightful and important," yet "linguistically opaque and conceptually
suspect." Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at Tf26.
The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt"
standard is also flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to
diminish the degree of proof necessary to convict and in that respect
violates the Victor [v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994),] standard. The
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"obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step undertaking: the
identification of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the doubt
against the evidence. This process suggests a back and forth
disputation of a doubt's merits, all to the end of determining
whether the evidence is sufficient to "obviate" the doubt. The
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not, however, condition
a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an ability either to
articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it.
Id. at \27. The court concluded, "[t]o the extent that the Robertson 'obviate' test
would permit the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are
sufficiently defined, the test works to improperly diminish the State's burden."
Id. at ^28.
Reyes thus holds that the "obviate test" diminishes the State's
constitutional burden of proof only to the extent it would "permit the State to
argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined."

Id.

Consequently, where the State does not argue that it need only obviate doubts
that are sufficiently defined, the "obviate test" does not diminish the State's
constitutional burden.
Defendant does not claim, nor does the record disclose, that the prosecutor
argued that the State need obviate only those doubts that are "sufficiently
defined." Aplt. Br. at 26-30. Instead, the prosecutor emphasized that portion of
the instruction which stated that a reasonable doubt must be "reasonable in view
of all of the evidence" and could not be a doubt "based on fancy, imagination, or
wholly speculative possibility."

R.179:133. He thus argued that the State's
20

evidence refuted all doubts — whether or not sufficiently defined —that were not
merely fanciful or speculative. He did not argue that he need not refute any
doubts because they were not "sufficiently defined/7 Reyes, 2005 UT 33, at ^[28.
Defendant's claim fails for another reason. "[S]o long as the reasonable
doubt instructions, 'taken as a whole, . . . correctly convey[ ] the concept of
reasonable doubt to the jury,' they pass constitutional muster." State v. Cruz,
2005 UT 45, TJ20,122 P.3d 543 (quoting Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 22 (1994)).
"Simply put, [the court] need only ask whether the instructions, taken as a
whole, correctly communicate the principle of reasonable doubt, namely, that a
defendant cannot be convicted of a crime 'except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged/" Id. at ^[21 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). In Cruz, the
supreme court approved a reasonable doubt instruction containing the sentence,
"The law does not require that the evidence dispel all possible or conceivable
doubt, but rather that it dispel all reasonable doubt." Id. at 11. In the context of
reasonable doubt instructions, "dispel," "obviate," and "eliminate" are
synonyms. So in effect, the Cruz jury, like the jury here, was told that the State
must "obviate all reasonable doubt."

Yet the Supreme Court approved the

instruction.
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The jury instructions here "pass constitutional muster" because, "taken as
a whole," they "correctly convey[ed] the concept of reasonable doubt to the
jury." Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
This concept was conveyed not only by the reasonable doubt instruction quoted
above, but also by one other. See R.128 ("In order to obtain a conviction, the
State must prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt") ("If
you believe that the state has proven each of these elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, you should find defendant guilty. If the state has failed to prove any one
of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant not
guilty").
In sum, even if defendant had not invited any error in the reasonable
doubt instruction, his claim would fail on its merits.
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
DISQUALIFY DEFENDANTS COUNSEL

REFUSED

TO

Defendant claims that the trial court failed to adequately inquiry into his
reasons for seeking to disqualify his appointed counsel, Mr. William Benge, and
that a sufficient inquiry would have revealed that Mr. Benge had an inherent
conflict of interest under the rules of professional

conduct requiring

disqualification. Aplt. Br. at 32-34. According to defendant, Mr. Benge's conflict
of interest arose because he previously prosecuted defendant on a misdemeanor
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DUI charge when he was Grand County Attorney, and that charge was used to
enhance defendant's DUI conviction in this case. Aplt. Br. at 33-35.
Defendant's claim fails. His reliance on the rules of professional conduct is
misplaced because an apparent violation of the professional rules does not entitle
defendant to reversal of his conviction. Rather, defendant must show a conflict
of interest violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Defendant does not
acknowledge, let alone satisfy, the constitutional standard.
Background. Defendant was charged on 16 April 2004 and Mr. William
Schultz was appointed to represent him. R.2, 15. On 1 February 2005 Mr.
Schultz moved to withdraw, and the trial court granted the motion. R.86, 88.
Although there is no order of appointment in the record, Mr. William Benge
entered an appearance as defendant's appointed counsel on 8 February 2005.
R.93.
Although he undoubtedly knew that Mr. Benge had previously prosecuted
him, defendant waited until the morning of trial—13 April 2005 —to bring this to
the court's attention. R.178:l, 7. Moreover, defendant's prior prosecution by Mr.
Benge was only one part of a larger discussion on defendant's motion for
continuance. R.178:5-23. Mr. Benge moved for a continuance on defendant's
behalf because (1) he had been unable to serve a subpoena on defense witness
Diana Hacker; (2) defendant informed him "this morning" that he wanted a
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continuance to retain private counsel; (3) he questioned defendant's competence
to proceed; and (4) defendant had failed to keep his appointments with Mr.
Benge so that they could prepare for trial. R.178:5-6,20-21.
When the court asked defendant to explain his plans for retaining other
counsel, defendant stated that he questioned Mr. Benge's appointment "from the
beginning because he has prosecuted me in your court before/'

R.178:7.

Defendant explained that he wanted to hire his own attorney because he had "a
hard time trusting [Mr. Benge]/7 R.178:7. The trial court then asked Mr. Benge
whether it was true that he had prosecuted defendant. R.178:22. Mr. Benge
explained that he had, but that he could not recall the case, or even the charge.
R.178:22. Defendant then stated that Mr. Benge had prosecuted him on two cases
before the trial court: "assault and a DUI." R.178:22. The trial court had no
recollection of either case. R.178:22. The court then asked defendant when the
prosecutions occurred. R.178:22. Defendant responded, "Nin[e]ty—." R.178:23.
The trial court then denied defendant's motion for a continuance, stating,
"I am not going to delay the trial because [defendant] wants a chance to hire
private counsel. We — we've been over this again and again. It's . . . a request
that I might have considered, had he made it [earlier]. But it's too late now."
R.178:23. Trial proceeded.
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Following the State's rebuttal evidence, but before the case had been
submitted to the jury, the court discussed with defendant his claims that Mr.
Benge should have introduced certain evidence. R.179:63-77. In the midst of that
discussion, defendant again mentioned that Mr. Benge had previously
prosecuted him.

R.179:68.

The court explained that it would not allow

defendant to present that fact to the jury because it was irrelevant. R.179:68. The
court again mentioned that the prosecution must have occurred " about 10 years
ago" because the court could not remember it.

R.179:69.

Only then did

defendant explain that the prosecution must have occurred after 1999 because he
was convicted after he and Jennifer started seeing each other. R.179:69. After
further discussion about whether Mr. Benge should have elicited additional
evidence, the prosecutor stated that he had reviewed a list of defendant's prior
convictions and discovered that Mr. Benge had prosecuted defendant for a class
B misdemeanor DUI in 2002 and that defendant had pled guilty to the charge.
R. 179:75-76. The trial court observed that the prosecution occurred "just at the
end of Mr. Benge's term as Grand County Attorney." R.179:76. The trial court
also noted that the prosecution had indeed occurred in his court because the case
also involved a class A misdemeanor charge. R.179:76. The jury had no evidence
of the prior DUI conviction during deliberations. R.179:140.
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After the jury returned a guilty verdict on the DUI charge, the court
explained to defendant that he could have either the jury or the court decide
whether he had prior DUI convictions that would enhance his present
conviction. R.179:139. Defendant responded, "It's already proven, so there's no
decision/'

R.179:140. The court clarified, asking "You think its' pretty well

established by the judgments themselves?" R.179:140. Defendant responded,
"Yes," and explicitly waived his right to have the jury decide the enhancement
issue. R.179:140.

The court then found that defendant had been convicted of

two prior DUI's, one in December, 2002, and another in April, 2004, and
therefore found defendant guilty of the enhanced DUI charge. R.179:144-45.
A, The trial court sufficiently inquired into Mr. Benge's prior
prosecution.
Defendant claims that the trial court failed to make a sufficient inquiry into
Mr. Benge's prior prosecution, and that had it done so, it would have learned
that Mr. Benge had prosecuted defendant for a DUI that was used to enhance the
DUI offense in this case. Aplt. Br. at 32-34. He relies on State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d
270, 273 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), for the proposition that, upon an expression of
dissatisfaction with appointed counsel, a trial court "must make some
reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine the nature of the defendant's
complaints and to apprise itself of the facts necessary to determine whether the
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defendant's relationship with his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to
the point that sound discretion requires substitution/7 Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 273.
The trial court made the required inquiry. The court asked all of the
questions necessary to determine whether the prior prosecution could create a
potential conflict of interest.
The prior DUI prosecution would create a potential conflict of interest only
if it was related to the current proceedings. "[T]he singular circumstance of
having prosecuted a defendant does not disqualify a former government
attorney from defending the same individual on subsequent criminal charges
unrelated to the attorney's former duties/7 See United States v. Smith, 653 F.2d
126,128 (4th Cir. 1981), abrogated on other grounds by Flanagan v. United States, 465
U.S. 259, 263 n.2 (1984). The prior DUI conviction could be related to the current
proceedings only if it could be used to enhance defendant's present DUI
conviction. The prior conviction could be used to enhance the present conviction
if it was obtained within the ten years of trial. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-503
(West 2004 & Supp. 2005) (establishing that a DUI conviction may be enhanced if
it occurs "within ten years of two or more prior convictions"). If the prior DUI
conviction occurred more than ten years before trial—in other words, before
April, 1995 — it would not give rise to a potential conflict of interest. See id.
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The trial court's pre-trial inquiry allowed defendant to explain that the
prior prosecution resulted in a DUI conviction that could be used to enhance his
present charge. The trial court learned that the prior prosecution was for a DUI
and asked when it occurred. Defendant's response, "Nin[e]ty

," placed the

prior conviction beyond the ten-year limit on convictions that could be used to
enhance a DUI charge. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-503 (West 2004 & Supp.
2005). Had defendant responded, as he did near the end of trial, that the prior
prosecution occurred sometime within the decade before trial, then the trial court
may well have had a duty to conduct a further inquiry to determine more
precisely the date of the prosecution. However, given defendant's response, no
further inquiry was necessary because the prior prosecution was too old to be
used to enhance the present charge, and therefore did not give rise to a potential
conflict. See Smith, 653 F.2d at 128 (holding that no conflict arises where defense
counsel previously prosecuted his client on an unrelated charge).
The trial court's inquiry gave defendant the opportunity, prior to trial, to
provide the information necessary to evaluate whether a conflict of interest
required substitution of counsel. Therefore, the inquiry was sufficient.
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B. In any event, any deficiency in the courts inquiry was
harmless because defendant has not demonstrated that a
conflict of interest required substitution of counsel.
Assuming arguendo that the trial court should have conducted a more
searching inquiry, any error was harmless because the prior prosecution did not
create a conflict of interest requiring substitution of counsel. See State v. Valencia,
2001 UT App. 159, f 14, 27 P.3d 573 (finding that any inadequacy in the inquiry
into an indigent defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel was harmless where
good cause did not require substitution of counsel).
Defendant claims that, under the rules of professional responsibility, the
prior prosecution created an "inherent conflict of interest" that required
substitution of counsel. Aplt. Br. at 30,34-35. His claim of a conflict of interest is
based exclusively on his interpretation rules 1.7 and 1.9 of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct. Aplt. Br. at 30-35.
Defendant's reliance on the rules of professional misconduct is misplaced.
Even assuming arguendo that the prior prosecution created a conflict under the
professional rules, a violation of those rules does not establish a violation of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. "[A] criminal defendant 'is not automatically
entitled to a reversal of his conviction' merely because of an apparent violation of
a rule of professional conduct.'" State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 492 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) (quoting State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)); see also Nix v.
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Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165-66 (1986) ("Under the Strickland standard, breach of
an ethical standard does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel77). In determining whether an
attorney possessed a conflict of interest, the "inquiry is not whether a state
disciplinary rule for lawyers has been violated by the [attorney], but whether,
everything considered, [defendant's] counsel 'actively7 represented conflicting
interests.77 United States v. Gallegos, 39 F.3d 276, 278 (10th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in
original).

Because defendant relies exclusively on the rules of professional

conduct to demonstrate a conflict of interest, his claim fails. See Larsen, 828 P.2d
at 492; Nix, 475 U.S. at 165-66; Gallegos, 39 F.3d at 278.
In any event, the prior prosecution did not create a conflict of interest
under the Sixth Amendment. To establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment's
right to counsel based on a conflict of interest, a defendant "must establish both
[1] that [counsel] had an actual conflict of interest, and [2] that the conflict
adversely affected [counsel's] performance." State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, ^[22, 984
P.2d 382 (citing State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 686 (Utah 1997)). Neither prong is
satisfied in this case.
"To establish an actual conflict of interest, [defendant] must show that [his
counsel] had to make choices that would advance his own interests to the
detriment of [defendant's]." Lovell, 1999 UT 40 at ^[22. Presumably, a conflict
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could arise if Mr. Benge had failed to challenge the validity of the prior DUI
conviction because he had been the prosecutor. However, nothing in the record
demonstrates, or even suggests, that Mr. Benge was so personally invested in the
prior DUI conviction that he chose to somehow advance his own interests by
refusing to challenge it. In fact, the record discloses no valid basis on which Mr.
Benge could have challenge the prior conviction that resulted from a guilty plea.
Therefore, the prior prosecution did not create an actual conflict of interest. See
id.
The Seventh Circuit found what it termed an " actual conflict of interest" in
United States v. Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d 937, 940-41 (7th Cir. 1989), because defense
counsel had appeared twenty years earlier as a prosecutor at a sentencing
hearing on charges that were used to enhance Ziegenhagen" s conviction. This
holding was based, in part, on the court's conclusion that defense counsel "could
[have] decide [d] his defense strategy either at sentencing or on appeal on the
basis of the conflict," and its further observation that "there may [have been]
countless ways in which the conflict could have hindered a fair trial, the
sentencing hearing or even this appeal."

Id. at 941. The Seventh Circuit

ultimately remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to "consider whether
the conflict of interest in this case denied Ziegenhagen the right to fair
representation or if Ziegenhagen waived the conflict." Id. at 938.
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Ziegenhagen is not persuasive precedent. The Seventh Circuit's finding of
an "actual conflict of interest" was premature because there was no evidence that
Ziegenhagen's counsel actually "was required to make a choice advancing his
own interests to the detriment of his client's interests." See Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d
at 939; see also Lovell, 1999 UT 40 at ^[22. Rather, the Court based its holding on
speculation that the conflict "could" have caused counsel to make such choices.
See Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d at 941. In fact, "the district court on remand in
Ziegenhagen found that the defense counsel played a peripheral role in the prior
prosecution and did not actively represent conflicting interests by defending
Ziegenhagen." Hernandez v. Johnson, 108 F.3d 554, 561 n.9 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing
United States v. Ziegenhagan, No. 89-1256; 907 F.2d 152,1900 U.S. App. Lexis 9835
(7th Cir. 1990)). Because no evidence demonstrated that Ziegenhagen's counsel
actively represented conflicting interests, the Seventh Circuit's holding is
unpersuasive.
Moreover, even if Mr. Benge's prior prosecution created an actual conflict,
nothing demonstrates, or even suggests that the conflict "adversely affected [his]
performance." See Lovell, 1999 UT 40 at ^22. As noted above, the record does not
reveal any valid basis upon which Mr. Benge could have challenged the prior
DUI conviction. Nor does defendant now provide one. Therefore, defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated based on a conflict of
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interest. See Hernandez v. Johnson, 108 F.3d 554, 560 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding no
conflict of interest where defense counsel participated in prior convictions that
were relied on at the penalty phase of a capital trial, in part because there was no
evidence "that there was a viable basis upon which the prior convictions could
be attacked"). Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's
request for substitute counsel. See State v. Valencia, 2001 UT App. 159, ^[14, 27
P.3d 573.
C. Any conflict affected only the DUI conviction.
Even if a conflict of interest existed for which Mr. Benge should have been
disqualified, that conflict affected only defendant's DUI conviction. Again, if any
conflict existed, it arose from Mr. Benge7s failure to challenge the validity of the
prior DUI conviction that was used to enhance defendant's current DUI
conviction. Therefore, the remedy for any error should be limited to reducing
the degree of the present DUI conviction from an enhanced third degree felony
to the standard class B misdemeanor. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-503(l)(a)
(West 2004) (classifying a first or second DUI conviction as a class B
misdemeanor).
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III. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY EXERCISED ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR
CONTINUANCE TO LOCATE A THIRD CHARACTER
WITNESS
Defendant claims that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a
continuance to locate a third character witness, Diana Hacker. Aplt. Br. at 36-39.
He argues that court should have granted his continuance because Hacker's
testimony was material and likely would have changed the outcome because
"this matter [was] a he said/she said type of case/' Aplt. Br. at 36-39. The trial
court denied the continuance on the basis that Hacker's character testimony
would be essentially cumulative of two other character witnesses—Joyce and
Jerome Jones —that defendant planned to call. R.178:15. The court stated, "I
don't think I'll postpone the trial because of one of three character witnesses is
not here."

R.178:15.

This was an appropriate exercise of the trial court's

discretion.
"When moving for a continuance, the moving party must show that denial
of the motion will prevent the party from obtaining material and admissible
evidence, that any additional witnesses it seeks can be produced within a
reasonable time, and that it has exercised due diligence in preparing for the case
before requesting the continuance." State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) (citing State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). A trial
court abuses its discretion in denying a continuance when "'review of the record
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persuades the court that without the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result for the defendant/" State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 40, f 8, 116
P.3d360.
Defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion
because he fails to show a reasonable likelihood that Hacker's testimony would
have changed the result. The trial court correctly found that Hacker's testimony
would have been merely cumulative of defendants two other character
witnesses—Joyce and Jerome Jones.

Moreover, contrary to defendant's

characterization, this case was not a mere credibility contest.
Defendant claims that, in contrast to Joyce and Jerome, Hacker would have
been a "long-term character witness" because she "lived next door to [Jennifer]
and [defendant] for years." Aplt. Br. at 37. However, Joyce and Jerome had also
known Jennifer and defendant for nearly their entire relationship. Joyce testified
that she had known both Jennifer and defendant "[a]lmost five years" at the time
of trial, and had been their neighbor for "somewhere around a year." R.179:7.
Jerome testified that he had known both Jennifer and defendant for "[a]bout
four-and-a-half years" at the time of trial. R.178:14. Jerome was the maintenance
person for the Slick Rock Campground, where Jennifer and defendant had lived,
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and saw the two "on a pretty regular basis."7

R.179:14-15.

defendant had been together for approximately five years.

Jennifer and
R.178:86, 190.

Therefore, contrary to defendant's suggestion, Hacker's association with Jennifer
and defendant was not significantly longer than Joyce's and Jerome's.
Defendant also claims that he "proffered that Hacker would have been
able to testify to an established pattern of behavior by [Jennifer] over years."
Aplt. Br. at 37. Actually, his proffer to the trial court stated that "Hacker would
testify that [1] [Jennifer] . . . is of a violent nature . . . [2] she has witnessed
Jennifer assault [defendant] severely on several occasions; [and 3] that
[defendant was] more of a victim in the fights . . . than [Jennifer] was." R.178:13.
This proffered testimony is merely cumulative of Joyce and Jerome's
testimony. Joyce testified that Jennifer was "mean and violent and she gets
drunk."

R.179:7. She also testified to one incident when she had observed

Jennifer assault defendant by "crackfing] him up the side of the [head] with a
frozen elk st[eak]." R.179:7,10. According to Joyce, Jennifer was the controlling
party in the relationship. R.179:8.
Jerome described the interaction between defendant and Jennifer as
"violent, at times." R.179:15. He testified that he had seen Jennifer assault
defendant at least three times and described two of those incidents. R.179:15.
7

The record does not establish how long Jennifer and defendant live at the
campground.
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On one occasion, Jerome saw Jennifer throw a package of elk steaks at defendant
and hit him in the back of the head. R.179:15. Jerome believed that the blow
"just about knocked [defendant] cold/7

R.179:15. Jerome described another

incident at the Outlaw Saloon where Jennifer hit defendant. R.179:15. Jerome
also testified that he viewed Jennifer as the dominant party in the relationship.
R.179:16.
Joyce and Jerome's testimony was substantively indistinguishable from
Hacker's proffered testimony. Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that
Hacker's testimony would have been merely cumulative.
Moreover, this case was not simply a credibility contest. The physical
evidence refuted defendant's story and confirmed Jennifer's. Defendant's claim
that Jennifer started the fight in the trailer by hitting him on the head with a lamp
was refuted by evidence that no broken lamp pieces were found on either of
Jennifer's couches, and also that defendant's head showed no signs of injury.
R.179:45, 50, 53. Jennifer's injuries, including her teeth being driven through her
lip, refuted defendant's claim that he was merely trying to defend himself
against Jennifer's assault by hitting her with the back of his hand. R.178:107-08,
109, 164, 208. Defendant's claim that he was merely trying to toss the log and
maul up to the porch was refuted by evidence that the window was five to six
feet from the porch. R.178:223. Finally, the fresh blood on his truck's steering
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wheel demonstrated that defendant lied when he claimed that Jennifer drove the
truck away from her trailer-a fact he eventually admitted at sentencing.
R.179:49, 54,56,157.
This was not a close case; substantial evidence supported Jennifer's version
of the events and refuted defendant's. Therefore, defendant cannot show that
Hacker's cumulative testimony would have likely changed the outcome of his
trial. Consequently, he has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his request for a continuance. See Taylor, 2005 UT 40, ^f8.
IV. DEFENDANT'S MERGER CLAIM IS UNPRESERVED; IN
ANY EVENT IT FAILS ON ITS MERITS
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to merge his assault
charge with his aggravated kidnapping charge. Aplt. Br. at 39-42. This Court
should not consider this claim because it is unpreserved and defendant argues
no exception to the preservation rule. Alternatively, the claim fails on its merits.
A. The claim is unpreserved.
Defendant's merger claim is unpreserved because he did not raise it the
trial court. "'Generally speaking, a timely and specific objection must be made
[at trial] in order to preserve an issue for appeal/" State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4,
Tfl4 (quoting State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, 1f45,114 P.3d 551) (additional citations
omitted). "When a party raises an issue on appeal without having properly
preserved the issue below, '[this Court will] require that the party articulate an
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appropriate justification for appellate review, . . . specifically, the party must
argue either plain error or exceptional circumstance/" Id. (quoting Finder, 2005
UT 15, 1(45) (additional quotations and citations omitted). Defendant did not
raise his merger claim below; therefore, it is unpreserved. See id.
This Court should not consider defendant's unpreserved merger claim
because he fails to argue that any exception to the preservation rule applies.
"[I]n general, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including constitutional
arguments, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed
plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances." State v. Dean, 2004
UT 63, |13, 95 P.3d 276 (citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, H 11,10 P.3d 346). A
party seeking review of an unpreserved issue must "articulate the justification
for review in the party's opening brief." State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, ^f 45, 114
P.3d 551 (citing Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, | 9,17 P.3d 1122). When a party
fails to do so, an appellate court may refuse to consider the unpreserved issue.
Id. at Tf1f50, 58 (refusing to consider Pinder's unpreserved claims because he
"failed to argue plain error or show exceptional circumstances on appeal").
Defendant does not argue that "plain error" or "exceptional circumstance"
should excuse his failure to preserve his merger claim; therefore, this Court
should decline to consider it. See id.
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B. In any event, the claim fails on its merits because materially
different acts established the two crimes.
Defendant claims that his assault conviction should merge into his
aggravated kidnapping conviction because the elements of assault are entirely
subsumed by the elements of aggravated kidnapping, and "[t]here were no
separate acts occurring by which to charge [him] separately for assault and
aggravated kidnap[p]ing."

Aplt. Br. at 39-42.

Defendant is incorrect.

A

comparison of the elements of assault and aggravated kidnapping demonstrates
that assault is not a lesser included offense of aggravated kidnapping. However,
even if it were, defendant's assault conviction does not merge into his
aggravated kidnapping conviction because the crimes were established by
independent acts.
Merger is appropriate when a defendant is convicted of both a greater and
a lesser included offense. See State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179, 1fl2, 72 P.3d 692.
However, where "materially different acts" establish the two convictions, the
convictions do not merge. See id. at f 16.
Here, defendant's assault and aggravated kidnapping convictions were
proven by materially different acts. Defendant committed three separate assaults
before the aggravated kidnapping began. Defendant committed assault when he
threw lamps and pictures around Jennifer's trailer in her presence, and again
when he threw the log and maul through the window of the room where Jennifer
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was sitting, because those unlawful acts "create[d] a substantial risk of bodily
injury to another/7 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76~5-102(c). Defendant committed a
third assault when he punched and kicked Jennifer, driving her teeth through
her lip, because those unlawful acts "cause[d] bodily injury to another/' See id.
Only after those assaults were completed did defendant commit aggravated
kidnapping by grabbing Jennifer by her hair and arm, dragging her out of her
trailer, and driving off with her in his truck while threatening to kill her. See
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-302(l)(b)(iv). Therefore, because "materially different
acts" establish the assault and aggravated kidnapping counts, the convictions do
not merge. See Smith, 2003 UT App 179 at 116.
V. THE PRESIDING JUDGE CORRECTLY DENIED
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE ANDERSON
Defendant argues that Judge Anderson should have recused himself, and
the presiding judge should have granted his motion to recuse Judge Anderson,
because Judge Anderson had violated his "right to file pleadings" by allegedly
instructing the court clerks to retain only those pro se filings from defendant that
listed a case number. Aplt. Br. at 42-45. Defendant's claim fails because he has
not demonstrated actual bias or abuse of discretion.
Rule 29(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure establishes the procedures
that a court must follow when a motion to disqualify a judge is filed. See Utah R.
Crim. P. 29(c). The rule provides that "[t]he judge against whom the motion and
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affidavit are directed shall, without further hearing, enter an order granting the
motion or certifying the motion and affidavit to a reviewing judge/ 7 Utah R.
Crim. P. 29(c)(2).
In this case, the trial court complied with Rule 29. Defendant filed a pro se
motion to disqualify. R.53. "Because defendant was represented by counsel, the
clerks did not file the document, but did call it to the attention of the court/7
R.53. At a subsequent hearing, the trial court asked defendant's counsel to file a
memorandum explaining his position on the motion to disqualify.

R.54.

Counsel filed a motion to disqualify and affidavit that "essentially repealed] the
language of the pro se motion, and state [d] that it [was] filed under an Anders
rationale."

R.54.

The affidavit also included a two-page hand-written

supplement to the motion prepared by defendant.

R.48-49. The trial court

entered an order referring the motion to the presiding judge. R.53-56. The order
explained the above background, and also stated that "since filing the motion to
disqualify, defendant ha[d] showered the court with papers that may or may not
be treated as pleadings. Those that bear a case number have been retained."
R.54-55.

The trial court forwarded to the presiding judge the motion to

disqualify, the

affidavit, "eighteen pages of handwritten submissions from

defendant bearing the case number for this case," and other materials. R.55. The
presiding judge denied the motion. R.73-76.
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If a trial judge complies with Rule 29 and is approved by the reviewing
judge to continue, "the burden shift[s] to the [defendant] to show actual bias or
abuse of discretion." State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1998) (citing State v.
Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091,1094 (Utah 1988)). Defendant has not shown either.
Defendant claims that he has shown actual bias because two of his alleged
pro se filings —the motion to disqualify, and a motion for speedy resolution—do
not appear in the record. Aplt. Br. at 43. He argues that "[t]he absence of these
pleadings from the district court record indicate that Judge Anderson possibly
instructed his clerks in a manner in violation of Ut. R. Civ. P. 10 (f)." Aplt. Br. at
44 (emphasis added). Defendant claims that Rule 10(f) required the clerk to
accept defendant's pro se filings. Aplt. Br. at 44. Defendant's allegations fail to
show actual bias.
Defendant had no right to file pro se pleadings while he was represented
by counsel, and Rule 10 does not create that right.

"When a defendant is

represented by counsel, he generally has no authority to file pro se motions, and
the court should not consider them." People v. Serio, 830 N.E.2d 749, 757 (111. App.
Ct. 2005). A defendant is not entitled to "'hybrid representation/ whereby he
would receive the services of counsel and still be permitted to file pro se
motions."

Id. (additional quotations

and citations omitted); see also

Commonwealth v. Battle, 879 A.2d 266, 268 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) ("there is no
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constitutional right to hybrid representation, neither on appeal, nor at trial");
People v. Rodriguez, 741 N.E.2d 882, 884 (N.Y. 2000) ("While the Sixth Amendment
and the State Constitution afford a defendant the right to counsel or to selfrepresentation, they do not guarantee a right to both").
The language of rule 10, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, does not create a
right to hybrid representation. The rule states that if papers filed with the court
"are not prepared in conformity with this rule, the clerk shall accept the filing but
may require counsel to substitute properly prepared papers for nonconforming
papers." Utah R. Civ. P. 10(f). It also states that "[t]he clerk or the court may
waive the requirements of this rule for parties appearing pro se." Id. Therefore,
the rule contemplates that a party is either represented by counsel, or is
appearing pro se, but not both. If a party is represented by counsel, and counsel
files a nonconforming pleading, the clerk "shall accept the filing but may require
counsel to substitute properly prepared papers." Id. On the other hand, if a
party is pro se, that party may obtain a waiver of the rule's requirements for
pleadings. Id. Therefore, Rule 10 does not allow a party to engage in hybrid
representation. Consequently, even if Judge Anderson instructed his clerks not
to retain defendant's pro se filings that did not contain a case number, those
instructions were correct.
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Even if defendant Rule 10 creates a right to engage in hybrid
representation, defendant has not shown that Judge Anderson actually
instructed his clerks to violate that right. As defendant admits, the fact that some
of defendant's pro se pleadings are allegedly missing from the record only
"indicate[s] that Judge Anderson possibly instructed his clerks in a manner in
violation of [rule 10]/' Aplt. Br. at 44 (emphasis added).
Moreover, even if Judge Anderson had instructed his clerks in violation of
the rule, defendant fails to explain how that action evidences actual bias. There
is no evidence that Judge Anderson's instructions were directed only at
defendant, as opposed to all defendants who seek to engage in hybrid
representation. Consequently, defendant has not shown that Judge Anderson
was actually biased. See Alonzo, 973 P.2d at 979.
For these same reasons, defendant has not shown that the presiding judge
abused his discretion in denying the motion to recuse. See id. Consequently,
defendant's claim fails.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm
convictions.

45

defendant's

Respectfully submitted JL-f January 2006.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD
Assistant Attorney General

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on -2*7 January 2006,1 mailed, postage prepaid, two
accurate copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to:
Autumn Fitzgerald
55 East 100 South
Moab, Ut 84532

46

Addenda

Addendum A

76-5-102. Assault
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily
injury to another.
Amended by Chapter 109,2003 General Session
76-5-302. Aggravated kidnapping.
(1) An actor commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the course of
committing unlawful detention or kidnapping:
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601; or
(b) acts with intent:
(i) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage,
or to compel a third person to engage in particular conduct or to
forbear from engaging in particular conduct;
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight
after commission or attempted commission of a felony;

(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony;
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another;
(v) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or
political function; or
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, Chapter 5,
Part 4, Sexual Offenses.
(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing unlawful detention or
kidnapping" means in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or in the
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a violation of:
(a) Section 76-5-301, kidnapping; or
(b) Section 76-5-304, unlawful detention.
(3) Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment
for an indeterminate term of not less than 6,10, or 15 years and which may be for
life. Imprisonment is mandatory in accordance with Section 76-3-406.
Amended by Chapter 301, 2001 General Session

Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 29. Disability and disqualification of a judge or change
of venue.
(c)(1)(A) A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to
disqualify a judge. The motion shall be accompanied by a certificate that the
motion is filed in good faith and shall be supported by an affidavit stating facts
sufficient to show bias or prejudice, or conflict of interest.
(B) The motion shall be filed after commencement of the action, but not
later than 20 days after the last of the following:
(i) assignment of the action or hearing to the judge;
(ii) appearance of the party or the party's attorney; or

(iii) the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise
of reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon
which the motion is based.
If the last event occurs fewer than 20 days prior to a hearing, the motion shall be
filed as soon as practicable.
(C) Signing the motion or affidavit constitutes a certificate under Rule 11,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and subjects the party or attorney to the
procedures and sanctions of Rule 11. No party may file more than one
motion to disqualify in an action.
(2) The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall, without
further hearing, enter an order granting the motion or certifying the motion and
affidavit to a reviewing judge. If the judge grants the motion, the order shall
direct the presiding judge of the court or, if the court has no presiding judge, the
presiding officer of the Judicial Council to assign another judge to the action or
hearing. Assignment in justice court cases shall be in accordance with Utah Code
Ann.' 78-5-138. The presiding judge of the court, any judge of the district, any
judge of a court of like jurisdiction, or the presiding officer of the Judicial Council
may serve as the reviewing judge.
(3)(A) If the reviewing judge finds that the motion and affidavit are timely filed,
filed in good faith and legally sufficient, the reviewing judge shall assign another
judge to the action or hearing or request the presiding judge or the presiding
officer of the Judicial Council to do so. Assignment in justice court cases shall be
in accordance with Utah Code Ann. ' 78-5-138.
(B) In determining issues of fact or of law, the reviewing judge may
consider any part of the record of the action and may request of the judge
who is the subject of the motion and affidavit an affidavit responsive to
questions posed by the reviewing judge.
(C) The reviewing judge may deny a motion not filed in a timely manner.
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 10. Form of pleadings and other papers.
(a) Caption; names of parties; other necessary information. All pleadings and
other papers filed with the court shall contain a caption setting forth the name of
the court, the title of the action, the file number, the name of the pleading or

other paper, and the name, if known, of the judge (and commissioner if
applicable) to whom the case is assigned. In the complaint, the title of the action
shall include the names of all the parties, but other pleadings and papers need
only state the name of the first party on each side with an indication that there
are other parties. A party whose name is not known shall be designated by any
name and the words "whose true name is unknown." In an action in rem,
unknown parties shall be designated as "all unknown persons who claim any
interest in the subject matter of the action." Every pleading and other paper filed
with the court shall also state the name, address, telephone number and bar
number of any attorney representing the party filing the paper, which
information shall appear in the top left-hand corner of the first page. Every
pleading shall state the name and address of the party for whom it is filed; this
information shall appear in the lower left-hand corner of the last page of the
pleading. The plaintiff shall file together with the complaint a completed cover
sheet substantially similar in form and content to the cover sheet approved by
*he Judicial Council.
(f) Enforcement by clerk; waiver for pro se parties. The clerk of the court shall
examine all pleadings and other papers filed with the court. If they are not
prepared in conformity with this rule, the clerk shall accept the filing but may
require counsel to substitute properly prepared papers for nonconforming
papers. The clerk or the court may waive the requirements of this rule for parties
appearing pro se. For good cause shown, the court may relieve any party of any
requirement of this rule.

Addendum B

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

\P

A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.

This presumption follows the defendant

throughout the trial.

If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond

a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted.
The state must eliminate (or obviate) all reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute
certainty.

Reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason, which is

reasonable in view of all the evidence.

Reasonable doubt is not

a doubt based on fancy, imagination, or wholly speculative
possibility.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof to

satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of those bound to
act conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt.
reasonable doubt is a doubt that reasonable people would
entertain based upon the evidence in the case.
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